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In the early 1960 ' s the role of the United States
as a leader of the free world as well as the economy of
this country, was more seriously affected by inter-
national economic forces than at any time in recent
peacetime history. The strength of the United States,
both at home and abroad, was linked with the strength
of the dollar and the dollar, was and still is the
primary currency in the Free World's financial structure.
While the dollar still commanded a high degree of confi-
dence throughout the world, it had lost some of its
luster and its strength relative to other currencies.
The dollar was no longer free from occasional fears
and suspicions. This condition had been brought about
by the persistent and sizable deficits in the United
States International Balance of Payments.
There was unanimous agreement on the need for
the United States to bring its international accounts
into equilibrium. The importance of a strong dollar
was most clear, not solely because of the role it played
in providing the world's monetary base, but primarily
to provide the strength to the voice of the United States




The United States rejected the classical measures
of devaluation and import restrictions (measures generally
taken by other countries when plagued with continuing
payments deficits and reserve losses) as a means for
solving its balance of payments problem. Instead, the
United States chose to redress the deficit in a gradual
and discretionary fashion in all categories of transactions
which make up the balance of payments. Concentrated action
was taken in an effort to increase United States exports
in the flow of trade between the United States and other
nations. Legislation was initiated which was designed
with the goal of slowing down private capital outflow
from the United States for long term foreign investment.
The Federal Reserve Board took action which was designed
to increase domestic short-term interest rates and
thereby retard the outflow of short-term capital from
the United States. The Department of Defense implemented
various actions to reduce the foreign exchange costs
associated with our overseas military commitments.
The determination of the United States to balance
its international transactions within the overall National
Security Objectives is reflected in the following excerpt
from President John P. Kennedy's address to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C. on September 30,
1963:
We are determined to do whatever must be done
in the interest of this country and, indeed, in the
interest of all to protect the dollar as a convertible
currency at its current fixed rate.
We are determined and I believe in your interests
as well as our own to maintain the firm relationship
of gold and the dollar at the present price of thirty
five dollars an ounce, and I can assure you will do
just that.
/
We do not seek by precipitous acts to improve
our position at the expense of others. We do seek
by comprehensive effort, consistent with our inter-
national responsibilities to reduce outflows which
are weakening our capacity to serve the world
community. In short, every nation in the world
has a direct interest, for the dollar is an inter-
national currency, and the security of the dollar
therefore involves the security of us all.
During the five year period 1958 through 1962, the net
deficits in the United States balance of payments averaged
a little more than three billion dollars per year. During
this same period, the deficits associated with our over-
seas military commitments slightly exceeded the average
annual net deficits. Since these military deficits
represented the largest single adverse factor in the
United States balance of payments position and fell
within the public sector - thus controllable by the
Federal Government, they were considered by many as the
prime cause of the overall balance of payments deficits
and were the initial target for action in solving the
problem. The Department of Defense initiated vigorous
economy efforts to hold down and reduce overseas
expenditures ; however, since our forces overseas represented
an integral part of the nation's defense programs, it was
intended that these reductions be accomplished without
jeopardizing essential national security objectives.
Purpose
The chief purpose of this dissertation is to
review the actions taken by the Department of Defense to
reduce overseas expenditures in order to curb the out
flow of "gold, " which became a significant concern of

President Kennedy immediately following his inauguration.
The examination, therefore, will focus on the time frame
of 1958 to the official beginning of the Vietnamese
Intervention (which is the Tonkin Incident of August 1964)
.
Additionally, this paper will consider other proposed
actions for the reduction of overseas expenditures which
could be taken without jeopardizing the security objectives
of the defense programs of the United States and its Allies,
Methodology
The approach used in the development of this effort
is that of library research. The bulk of the source
material used herein came from public documents, Department
of Defense files, and interviews with responsible govern-
ment and civilian officials knowledgeable in the area
under examination. It should be noted, however, that
numerous secondary works were reviewed and utilized also.
Chapter II will attempt to summarize the material
presented and to offer various conclusions derived there-
from.
Chapters III and IV will attempt to describe and
analyze the actions of the Department of Defense in trying
to accomplish a reduction in the Balance of Payments
Deficit.
Chapter V will attempt to provide a brief overview
of reporting problems in the Balance of Payments Deficit.
•
CHAPTER II
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS
AND RELATED PROBLEMS
Spending, borrowing and lending, and investing
are not confined within national boundary lines. Consumers
and business firms in the United States buy goods and serv-
ices from all over the world. United States citizens and
business firms lend and invest in foreign countries;
foreigners lend and invest in the United States. United
States financial institutions and business concerns pay
interest and dividends on foreign investments in this
country and, in turn, receive income on funds invested
abroad. United States citizens have always spent large
amounts for foreign travel; foreign visitors always spend
in the United States. The United States Government makes
payments abroad; foreign governments make payments here.
These are only a few illustrations on the multitude of
transactions that crisscross national boundaries. Some
transactions result in receipts from others in payments
to foreign countries. A summary tabulation of all of
these transactions during a given period of time is
commonly referred to as the "Balance-of-Payments. " If
Clay J. Anderson, "Defending the Dollar" in
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Publication,
November 1962, p. 1.

6payments are larger than receipts, a country has a deficit;
if receipts are larger than payments, it has a surplus
in its international balance of payments.
Except for the year 1957, the United States
balance of payments has shown a deficit every year since
1950. Between 1950 and 1956, the deficits averaged one
and one-half billion dollars per year and were of no real
concern to the United States:
These earlier deficits in our balance-of-payments
were, in fact, favorable in their world effect. They
helped to restore foreign monetary systems by enabling
foreign governments to earn the dollars which they
needed to rebuild their international reserve. They
made it possible for the industrialized countries of
Western Europe to restore the convertibility of their
currencies, thus freeing world trade and payments
from exchange control. This was a benefit to the
export trade of the United States. 2
Furthermore, the payments deficits generated during this
period caused little loss of gold from the United States
gold reserves. Because of the special role of the dollar
as a standard and store of value, it became convenient
for foreign commercial banks to hold large operating
balances of United States dollars as the medium of inter-
national exchange. In addition, it became a matter of
policy for many foreign financial institutions to hold
part of their official reserves in dollars or dollar claims
(deposits with United States banks and United States
Treasury obligations)
.
In 1957, the United States balance of payments
2John F. Kennedy, Message to Congress on Balance
of Payments and Gold , February 6, 1961, Congressional
Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XVII, 1961.
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reflected a small surplus. This was the result of the
abnormal increase in United States exports of petroleum
and petroleum products during the Suez crisis.
Beginning with 1958, and continuing for a five
year period, the United States balance-of-payments reflected
large deficits which averaged a little over three billion
dollars per year. Unlike the conditions that existed
during 1950-56 period when commercial banks and foreign
institutions were building their dollar operating accounts
and reserves, the large payments deficits generated during
the 1958 thru 1962 period were accompanied with a loss of
gold from the United States gold reserves. Foreign
financial institutions were converting the growing supply
of dollars into gold by buying gold from the United States
Treasury. Out of the nearly sixteen billion dollar
cumulative 1958-1962 deficits, almost seven billion
dollars of gold reserves were transferred to foreign
ownership. This represented a thirty per cent decline in
United States gold stocks from that held in 1957.
The gold transfers did not make the underlying
balance of payments fundamentally worse. They did
reflect a decision by foreigners to take more of
their earnings in gold and to hold less in dollars.
3
The loss of seven billion dollars of gold reserves
was not, in itself, the basis of concern since the United
States still had approximately seventeen billion dollars
of gold reserves, which represented forty per cent of the
free world's gold holdings. The official concern, in the
United States and abroad, was that foreign countries held
3 Ibid.

8about twelve billion dollars worth of their official
reserves in the form of dollar claims which were
redeemable in gold from the United States Treasury.
Furthermore, short-term and other liquid liabilities
of the United States, in the form of dollar claims held
by foreigners, had grown to approximately fifteen and one-
half billion dollars. These dollar claims could readily
find their way into foreign financial institutional
channels and then be used to buy additional gold from
the United States Treasury. The combined total of
official and unofficial "gold" claims exceeded the amount
of the United States gold reserves.
The receipts and expenditures which made up the
United States balance of payments resulted from a great
number of transactions. It was the combined effect of
all of these transactions that generated the payments
deficits. While the causes of the deficits cannot
always be clearly pinpointed, grouping the transactions
into major components or categories can identify the
strengths and weaknesses of the tnited States balance
of payments.
Exports and Imports of Goods and Services
The United States had had a surplus on goods and
services for many years. Receipts from sales of merchandise,
services rendered foreigners, and income on foreign invest-
ments had substantially exceeded payments to foreigners
for these purposes. The annual surplus on goods and
services from 1949 to 1960 had ranged from a low of about
two billion dollars to a high of over eight billion
dollars. In 1961, the surplus exceeded seven billion
•"• 3J
dollars. Merchandise contributed to the major part of
the United States surplus on goods and services. The
excess of merchandise exports over imports averaged
around four million dollars during the period 1959-1964.
4
During this period, the United States sold more goods
than it bought in practically all major geographical sectors
of the free world—Canada, Western Europe, Asia, and
Africa. However, the export surplus was not large enough
to offset other international expenditures. Furthermore,
since a considerable part of this surplus export may be
traced to aid-generated exports and to United States
private capital outflows, performance in this category
is not as satisfactory as would appear at first glance.
This condition, coupled with the rising relative
productivity trends in Western Europe and the growth and
development of the European Common Market, generated
considerable concern that the United States would not
be able to continue to maintain its traditional surplus
in merchandise trade. One of the goals of the Common
Market was the removal of tariff and trade barriers
between member countries and the establishment of a
uniform external tariff on imports from outside the Common
Market. Substantial progress had already been made
through 1964 in reducing tariffs among Common Market
countries. United States exports to the Common Market
countries had consistently exceeded imports from these
countries. The annual export surplus from 1959-1964
averaged one billion dollars. As tariff and trade barriers
Clay J. Anderson, "Defending the Dollar" in
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Publication,
November 1962, p. 5.
' •
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within the Common Market countries were lowered and
eliminated, producers in those countries had an increasing
advantage in competing with the United States exporters.
Reduced tariffs and trade barriers within the Common
Market countries also tended to reduce the costs of raw
material and semi- finished goods thereby resulting in
lower finished-goods prices which allowed them to be
more competitive in member countries, and consequently
increased their share of export markets. There was a
widespread impression that the best the United States
could hope for by a vigorous trade expansion program within
the authority of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 would be
to maintain the share of exports and to obtain its share
of any rising volume of exports.
5
Private Capital Movements
One of the major factors in the United States
balance-of-payments deficit during those years was the
very large outflow of United States private capital. From
1950 to 1955, the outflow of United States long-term and
short-term private capital averaged about one billion one
hundred million dollars per year. In 1960 and 1961, the
recorded United States capital outflow was three billion
nine hundred million dollars average per year. 6 in
"'Seymour E. Harris, "The U. S. Balance of Payments,
The Problem and its Solution, " Published in 78th Congress,
3d Session, Joint Committee Publication, Factors Affecting
the United States Balance of Payments , U. S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1962, pp. 1-25.
°Edward M. Bernstein, "The Long-Run Prospects for
the U. S. Balance of Payments, " 78th Congress, 2d Session,
Joint Committee Publication, Factors Affecting the United
States Balance of Payments , U. S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1962, pp. 371-394.
,
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addition to the recorded transactions, there is reasonable
evidence that a large percentage of the deficits in the
"Unrecorded Transactions" represents outflow of short-
term private capital.
On the basis of this it could be concluded that
the balance-of-payments difficulties of the United States
were the direct result of United States private capital
movements abroad. Such a conclusion, based upon the
statistics alone, would be superficial. It has been
established that the outflow of private capital in some
instances replaced the need for United States Government
loans and grants, thereby helping to moderate the deficits
in the "United States Government Account" sector of the
balance of payments. Others have identified private capital
outflow with the export of capital equipment, raw materials
and goods which in turn, contributes to the surplus in the
"Export of Goods and Services" sector of the balance of
payments. These factors, coupled with the sizable earnings
that are made from the foreign investments, gives rise to
serious questions on whether United States private long-
term capital movements abroad were detrimental or beneficial
to the United States balance of payments
.
The views expressed by some that investments
abroad benefit the United States balance-of-payments is
substantiated in a study, prepared by Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey, of the accounts of approximately two hundred
'Philip W. Bell, "Private Capital Movements and
the United States Balance of Payment Position, " 78th
Congress, 3d Session, Joint Committee Publication, Factors
Affecting the United States Balance of Payments , U. S.




United States oil companies who operated internationally
for five years or longer. This study shows that profits
from oil operations abroad, together with proceeds of
United States oil equipment sold overseas, more than out-
weighed the total capital outflow for oil investment abroad
and expenditures on oil imported into the United States.
The net outflow resulting from international oil trading
by United States companies amounted to $638 million in
1962 and to $1,635 million from 1958 to 1963. 8
Walter S. Salant, in his book "U. S. Balance of
Payments in 1968" indicates that:
The weakening in the balance of payments caused
by a new flow of funds from the United States is match-
ed by the cumulation of annual inflows of funds
resulting from the original investment somewhere
between the fifth and sixth year following the invest-
ment. By the end of the tenth year, the sum of the
inflows is more than double the original outflow
and the beneficial effects continue at a growing
rate thereafter.
If, in fact, United States private investments
abroad were beneficial to the long-term United States
balance-of-payments and they were greatly instrumental
in maintaining the international solvency of the United
States—assets of seventy-seven billion dollars (total
United States investments abroad) far exceeded liabilities
of fifty billion dollars (total foreign investments in
the United States) the question arises: what was the
concern about the balance-of-payments deficits and specif-
ically why were actions considered to stem the flow of
8
"USA, Oil Helps Payments Balance," Published in
Petroleum Press Service . Volume XXX, No. 2, December 1963.
9Walter S. Salant (and others), "U. S. Balance of
Payments in 1968," Brookings Institute, p. 145, pp. 298.
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United States private investment to foreign countries?
The answers to these questions deals with the
immediate effects the long-term investments had on the
United States balance-of-payments and their direct
bearing on the liquidity position of the United States.
More than one-half of the fifty billion dollars liabili-
ties to foreigners were short-term. They consisted mainly
of time deposits at commercial banks, United States
government securities, commercial paper and demand
deposits in American banks. Foreign governments and
international organizations accounted for the largest
part of dollar claims against the United States. The
willingness of foreigners to hold dollars and dollar
claims is based on the belief that they will be able to
convert their dollars into gold and that the prevailing
price or conversion rate of thirty-five dollars per
ounce of gold will not be altered. Only official holders
—
governments and central banks—can convert their dollar
holdings into gold. Foreign private holders of dollars
and dollar claims, on the other hand, cannot buy gold
from the United States. However, when their short-term
dollars and dollar claims greatly exceed the amount they
need as working balances in conducting international
transactions, they will normally convert dollars into
their local or other needed currencies. In this way,
foreign dollar holdings could shift from private to
offical hands, and from a potential claim to a possible
direct claim against our gold reserves. The potential
and possible dollar claims exceeded our total gold
reserves during this period. Any loss of confidence that
the United States would maintain the value of the dollar
• r
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could generate a sudden massive international transfer of
private dollar claim holdings and subsequently a "run"
on the United States gold reserves.
In contrast to the foreign investments in the
United States, over sixty-five per cent of the seventy-
seven billion dollars worth of United States investments
abroad were private long-term investments and could not
be quickly disposed of for foreign currencies without
great loss. The United States long-term foreign invest-
ments were of little value to counter a "run" upon the
United States gold reserves.
In July 1963, several moves were directed by the
Kennedy Administration at different elements in the
private capital situation. First, the Federal Reserve
Board allowed interest rates to rise with the aim of
reversing or at least reducing the outflow of short-term
funds. Secondly, an "Interest Equalization Tax" was
proposed to raise the cost of foreign borrowing in the
United States capital market. Thirdly, substantial cuts
in taxation were proposed to stimulate more investment
at home. Finally, a number of financial devices, including
currency "swaps" with central banks of other countries,
were adopted with the objective of reducing foreign
holdings of dollars convertible into gold. The results
of these moves led to a marked improvement in the United
States balance-of-payments during the third quarter of
1963. 10
10
"Oil and the U. S. Payments Crisis," Petroleum
Press Service . Volume XXX, No. 11, November 1963.
Ic
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United States Government Transactions
United States Government payments abroad were
much larger than receipts from foreign governments. In
1961, payments exceeded receipts by nearly six billion
dollars and the net outflow on United States government
transactions averaged about this amount annually during
the period 1958-1963. The two major categories of trans-
actions contributing to the deficits in this area were:
(1) Defense Expenditures abroad for goods and services;
and, (2) Transactions associated with the United States
Foreign Assistance Programs.
Defense transactions will be discussed in detail
in the next chapter.
United States Foreign Assistance Programs
From 1946-1964, extensive aid by the United States
assisted foreign countries to have fewer import restrictions,
to control currency devaluations, and to accumulate dollar
reserves that staved off economic and political chaos and
collapse. Programs of reconstruction and development
were carried on, levels of production were raised, depend-
ence on the United States gradually reduced, native
political stability was enhanced, and military rearmament
speeded up in order to resist totalitarian encroachments.
The foreign aid programs that evolved in form and
scope helped to serve the national objectives of this
country and to deal effectively with the changing inter-
national situation. The programs of 1947 to Greece and
Turkey were primarily military and enabled these countries
to withstand external communist pressures and to put down
i
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internal communist inspired aggression. The aid to Western
Europe, commencing in 1947, was essentially economic in
nature with its stated purpose of promoting industrial
and agriculture production, securing financial stability,
and aiding international trade relations. Again, for a
time during the period of the Korean conflict, the
principal goal of foreign assistance was to develop
military strength and to shore up unstable economies on
the periphery of the communist world. As of 1964, two-
thirds of all assistance was devoted to the objective of
promoting economic and social progress in under developed
countries. Another important trend in foreign assistance
was the shift from grants to loans. Under the Marshall
Plan, almost ninety per cent of aid to Europe was in the
form of grants . The technical assistance and supporting
assistance that followed also employed grants as the
major instrument of aid. However, as the concept of long-
term development and concentration of resources grew,
loans became the principal form of assistance. For
example the fiscal year 1964 budget for the Agency for
International Development called for sixty per cent of
its program to be in the form of loans.
It was claimed that United States foreign assistance
was responsible for the balance-of-payments deficit and
the gold drain and that the elimination of the program
would not only solve the problem but would reduce govern-
ment expenditures and tax needs, at least in that area.
Proponents of foreign aid contended that peaceful assistance
is constructive and cheaper than armaments powerful enough
to yield equivalent protection.
President John F. Kennedy, in his message to Congress
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on April 2, 1963, dealt with the cost of foreign aid
programs and their need when he stated:
The United States today is spending over 10 per
cent of its gross national product on programs
primarily aimed at improving our national security.
Somewhat less than one-twelfth of this amount, and
less than 0.7 per cent of our GNP, goes into the
mutual assistance program: roughly half for economic
development, and half for military and other short-
term assistance. The contribution of this program
to our national interest clearly outweigh its cost.
The richest nation in the world would surely be
justified in spending less than one per cent of
its national income on assistance to its less
fortunate sister nations solely as a matter of
international responsibility; but inasmuch as these
programs are not merely the right thing to do, but
clearly in our national self-interest, all criticisms
should be placed in that prespective. That our aid
programs can be improved is not a matter of debate.
But that our aid programs serve both our national
traditions and our national interest is beyond all
reasonable doubt. *-^
The Honorable David E. Bell, Administrator, Agency
for International Development, at a hearing before the
Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States,
in 1963 addressed himself to the question of foreign aid
impact upon the United States balance of payments when
he stated:
Today, fully eighty percent of A.I.D. funds are
committed for the export of U. S. goods and services
—
not dollars. Of the less than twenty percent which
will enter the balance of payments, all but a minor
fraction will be spent in less-developed—not
John P. Kennedy, Message to Congress on Proposed
Mutual Defense and Assistance Programs FY 1964 , 2 April
1964, Published in "Proposed Mutual Defense and Assistance
Programs FY 1964," U. S. Government Printing Office,




. . . The effect of existing
A. I. D. procurement policies has been to increase
A. I. D. financed exports of commodities and services
sharply. ... By confining an increasingly larger
proportion of its commodity financing to United
States exports, economic aid contributes to the
United States merchandise exports. In calendar year
1962, United States merchandise exports totalled
$20.5 billion and the surplus over imports was $4.3
billion. If the $2.3 billion in commodities financed
by "economic aid" as broadly defined (including
Public Law 480 surplus agriculture commodities as
well as A. I. D. financed exports), are deducted,
the surplus would be reduced to $2 billion. -^
Looking beyond the balance of payments problem,
there appears to be positive long-term gains to be won
for the United States from the growth of economies
abroad—the main purpose of the foreign aid programs.
Prosperous nations buy more than the poor ones. United
States exports to the "Marshall Plan" countries more
than doubled from 1950 to 1962. However, United States
exports to the less-developed countries rose by only
fifteen per cent during the 1950' s.
Although there was increasing criticism of the
United States foreign aid programs, some of which appeared
wholly justified, these aid programs generally did what
they were expected to do. The aid programs were supported
by four successive Presidents—Democratic and Republican
alike—and indorsed by a bipartisan majority of ten
12David E. Bell, "Mutual Defense and Assistance
Programs, " Remarks at the Hearings before the Joint
Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 88th
Congress, 1st Session, Pursuant to Sec. 5(a) of Public
Law 304 (79th Congress) , Part I - Current Problems and




successive Congresses. The aid programs were and are
necessary and hopefully will continue to recieve the support
of the majority of the American people.

CHAPTER III
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ACTIONS TO IMPROVE
THE UNITED STATES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Up to as late as I960, Department of Defense
overseas activities were operating under procurement
policies which encouraged maximum utilization of foreign
sources for supplies and material needed to support their
overseas operations.
In early 1952, the Department of Defense "Offshore
Procurement Program" was implemented. The purpose of
this program was to create or expand sources of supply-
abroad which would be nearer to the area where require-
ments are generated and consumed and to strengthen the
mobilization base of our Allies and thus decrease their
dependence upon the United States. By the end of 1956,
over two billion dollars had been spent by the United
States for procurement from foreign producers under this
program . *-
Complementary to the "Offshore Procurement Program"
was the "Facilities Assistance Program, " initiated in
fiscal year 1954. The primary purpose of this program
was to create local sources of supply for propellent and
explosives production by furnishing equipment and technical
U. S. Department of the Air Force, Information
and Guidance, Military Assistance Program , Washington,







assistance for the construction of facilities in Western
Europe for these purposes. The initial program was highly
successful and was then broadened for the purpose of
establishing centrally located facilities in Europe for
the international cross-servicing and maintenance of
material furnished under the Military Assistance Program. 2
In addition to the "Offshore Procurement" and
"Facilities Assistance" programs, which dealt primarily
with major items of supply and material, overseas procure-
ment activities were strongly encouraged to utilize
foreign sources of supply to the maximum extent possible
to satisfy their requirements for commercial "off-the-
shelf" items required for normal day-to-day operations
and maintenance.
These procurement programs and policies, coupled
with (1) the expenditures by United States servicemen
and civilians, employed by the overseas military
installations, and their dependents on the local economies;
(2) Department of Defense contributions to jointly
financed and jointly used NATO facilities—such as air-
fields, communication facilities and depots, generated
gross military expenditures entering into the United
States Balance-of-Payments of two billion one hundred million
dollars average per year during the period 1950 thru
1956 and three billion one hundred million dollars average
per year during the period 1957 thru I960. 3
2Ibid ., p. 19.
JU. S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business
Economics, Balance of Payments Statistical Supplement
Revised Edition , U. S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, Pt. 4, p. 259.
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Although studies for reducing overseas defense
expenditures were being conducted within the Department
Of Defense during the latter part of 1959 and early I960,
the first positive action towards reducing the defense
contributions to the deficit in the United States balance-
of-payments came on November 17, I960, when President
Dwight D. Eisenhower directed the Secretary of Defense to:
Reduce and thereafter limit the number of dependents
abroad of military and civilian personnel to a total
of not more than 200,000 at any one time, which total
shall be subject to annual review. This reduction
shall be accomplished at the rate of not less then
15,000 per month commencing January 1, 1961, pursuant
to such rules and regulations as the Secretary may
prescribe and shall, to the maximum extent feasible,
apply to dependents located in highly industrialized
countries with strong currencies. Exceptions to the
foregoing limitations shall require the personal
authorization of the Secretary or Deputy Secretary
of Defense.
Take promptly all possible steps to reduce by a
very substantial amount the expenditures, from funds
appropriated to the military services and for the
military assistance program, that are planned for
procurement abroad during calander year 1961, by
establishing a minimum amount by which such procure-
ment shall be reduced.
Prohibit the purchase of foreign goods by the
non-appropriated fund activities related to the
military services, except where exceptions to this
prohibition are made under the personal authorization
of the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.
4
President Kennedy, immediately upon entering office,
ordered a reappraisal of the balance-of-payment situation
4U. S. President, 1952-1960 (Eisenhower) , Directive
by the President Concerning Steps to be Taken with Respect
to the United States Balance of Payments . November 16, 1960,
Federal Register, Vol. 25, No. 232, Washington, Wednesday,
pp. 12219-12278, p. 12221. -
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with particular reference to the then outstanding order
to reduce the number of dependents of Department of
Defense Personnel overseas. On February 6, 1961,
President Kennedy advised Congress that " ... it has
become clear that the present limitation on dependents
was not the best way to accomplish this savings, and that
this limitation was seriously hurting morale and recruit-
ment in the armed forces. "5 He further advised Congress
that the savings expected from the restriction of military
dependents overseas could be made through other measures
and therefore he had directed the Secretary of Defense
to rescind the limitation on dependents and to put the
other measures into effect immediately.
As subsequent action to the Presidential directives
of November 16, 1960 and February 6, 1961, the Department
of Defense implemented a series of actions to reduce the
net adverse effect military expenditures were having upon
the United States balance of payments. In directing these
actions, the Secretary of Defense established a prime
objective of the Department of Defense, the reduction of
the net adverse balance of United States defense expendi-
tures entering the international balance of payments by
one billion dollars between fiscal years 1961 and 1963. 6
5U. S. President, 1961-1963 (Kennedy) Message to
Congress on Balance of Payments and Gold , February 6,
1961, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XVII, 1961.
Charles J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Statement before the Subcommittee on International
Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic Committee ,
December 12, 1962, Pt. 2.2, p. 19.
I
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He further established a long-term objective to reduce
the total net adverse dollar outflow stemming from defense
programs to one billion dollars by fiscal year 1966.
The Department of Defense's efforts to reduce
overseas military expenditures can be divided roughly
into the following areas: (1) the reduction of overseas
expenditures for major equipment and supplies from the
military function appropriations; (2) the reduction of
overseas expenditures by individuals (United States
military and civilian personnel and their dependents)
;
(3) the reduction of overseas expenditures for the Military
Assistance Program; and (4) the review of overseas bases
and construction projects to preclude unnecessary foreign
exchange costs. 7 Since the Presidential directive of
November 16 , 1960 , a series of Department of Defense
directives were issued in each of the above major areas,
some modifying and/or superceding previous directives on
the same subject. In many cases directives in one area
are functionally related to directives in another area only
by the fact that actions under these directives result
in transactions entering into the United States balance-
of-payments. For this reason, the various actions taken
by the Department of Defense have been segregated for
discussion under the major categories outlined above.
Overseas Expenditures for
Maior Equipment and Supplies
The first of a series of Department of Defense




to be procured and used outside of the United States was
issued on December 16, 1960. This directive established
as a minimum goal the reduction of sixty- five million
dollars in planned foreign purchases during calendar year
1961. To meet this goal, guidelines were established for
determining which purchases would no longer be purchased
abroad:
Requirements for supplies of foreign origin will
be reviewed to determine whether domestic supplies
can adequately fulfill the needs of the services.
Where it is estimated that the cost of United
States supplies or services (including transportation
and handling costs) will not exceed the cost of foreign
supplies or services by more than twenty-five percent,
such proposed purchases shall normally be returned to
the United States for award. Judgment should be
exercised with respect to large purchases coming
within this category involving the maximum differential.
Future research and development programs planned
abroad shall be reviewed to determine if United
States firms or individuals possess the requisite
qualifications to perform the research and develop-
ment work but due consideration should be given to
the interdependence of such research work being
performed abroad with other joint programs of the
United States and other governments. 8
Exceptions were granted in this directive from the guide-
lines to allow: (1) emergency purchases; (2) purchases
under one thousand dollars; (3) purchases of subsistence
which were so fragile or perishable that their quality at
the point of consumption would be impaired or destroyed
if shipped from the United States; (4) purchases of supplies
o
U. S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary
of Defense, "Supplies and Services to be Procured and Used
Outside of the United States, " Memorandum, to the Service
Secretaries, V7ashington, D. C, December 16, 1960.
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and services available only from foreign sources and for
which there are no acceptable substitutes; (5) purchases
made with excess foreign currencies held by the United
States Treasury to the extent such purchases avoid an
adverse effect upon the United States balance-of-payments;
(6) purchases of supplies or services required to be made
pursuant to a treaty or executive agreement; and (7) other
purchases as specifically authorized by the Secretary of
Defense.
The directive of December 16, 1960 was extremely
broad in scope and with flexible terms. Apparently, the
underlying intent of the directive was to give the
military services sufficient latitude and discretion in
establishing specific measures to accomplish the objective.
For example, on the guideline for the purchase of supplies
and services involving a price differential, the word
"normally" was used leaving to service decision the
returning of requirements where the cost differential
was less than twenty- five per cent. Furthermore, the
statement "to use judgment with respect to requirements
involving the maximum differential" was interpreted by
most overseas activities as giving substantial weight to
budgetary consideration in connection with large purchases,
even though the cost of the supplies or services in the
United States (including transportation and handling costs)
was within the twenty-five per cent differential. In
addition, the directive was silent as to the level of
authority necessary to make the various determinations
(e.g., whether to buy United States or foreign when the
requirement was large and the price differential was
slightly below twenty-five per cent), required by the
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directive. Accordingly, this authority was exercised by
various individuals at different levels at overseas
installations, each using his own interpretation of the
directive.
Although it was anticipated that the directive
of December 16, 1960 would easily meet the minimum objec-
tive of reducing planned overseas procurement by sixty-
five million dollars, an analysis of departmental reports
covering the first half of calendar year 1961, revealed
that the goals were not being met. To provide a broader
base for opportunities to reduce purchases from foreign
suppliers, the directive was expanded on August 9, 1961,
^
to apply to proposed purchases to be made by purchasing
offices located within the United States of supplies and
services solely for use outside the United States, its
possessions and Puerto Rico.
On July 16, 1962, the Secretary of Defense issued
a revised directive governing the purchases of supplies
and services for use outside the United States, its
possessions, and Puerto Rico.-L0 This revised directive
closed most of the "loop holes" of the December 16, 1960
directive by: (1) providing that the procurement action
would be restricted to domestic source end products or
services of domestic concerns, when the estimated price
of the requirement, delivered from United States sources,
would not exceed $10,000; (2) providing that the procure-
ment action would be restricted to domestic source end
9Idem., August 9, 1962.
10 Idem., July 16, 1962.
-
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products or services of domestic concerns, when the
estimated cost of the requirement was more than $10,000,
but it was estimated that the cost of domestic source
end products, or services of domestic concerns (including
transportation and handling costs) would not be more than
fifty per cent in excess of the cost of foreign supplies
or services (including transportation and handling costs)
;
and, (3) providing that in all instances where the estimated
cost of a requirement was in excess of $10,000 and the
estimated or actual cost of domestic source end products
or services of domestic concerns would be more than fifty
per cent in excess of the cost of foreign supplies or
services, the requirement and supporting data would be
submitted to the Secretary of Defense for determination
whether to buy domestic end products or services of
domestic concerns or foreign supplies or services.
In addition to outlining specific procedures
governing the solicitation of bids and proposals for
supplies and services to be used outside the United States,
its possessions and Puerto Rico, the July 16, 1962
directive made substantial changes in the exceptions
previously allowed from the prescribed procurement
policy on applying the price differential in evaluating
bids or proposals on domestic end products or the services
of domestic concerns. These changes included: (1) the
authority to accomplish small purchases in overseas areas
without cost determinations between domestic and foreign
products or services was reduced from one thousand to
five hundred dollars per transaction; (2) a limitation
of ten thousand dollars vas placed upon the use of the
exception allowing procurement from foreign sources of
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requirements under compelling emergencies; (3) the excep-
tion allowing the procurement of perishable subsistence
items (such as fresh vegetables, fresh fruit, milk, etc.)
which are of such a nature that their quality at the point
of consumption would be destroyed or significantly impared
if shipped from the United States remained; however, the
making of this determination was restricted to the Command-
ers of specific military commands and forces with authority
to redelegate this authority to individuals at lower
echelons only for those procurements which were estimated
not to exceed ten thousand dollars; and (4) the authority
to make the determination—that the requirement was of
a nature that could be filled only by foreign suppliers
or service concerns—was greatly curtailed by specifying
that the Commanders of military commands would make the
determination for procurements estimated not to exceed
one million dollars (with power of redelegation of the
determination authority to lower echelons for requirements
estimated not to exceed ten thousand dollars) ; that the
Departmental Secretaries or the Director, Defense Supply
Agency, as appropriate, would make the determination on
requirements estimated to exceed one million dollars
but not more than three million dollars; and that the
Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense
would make the determination for all procurements estimated
to exceed three million dollars.
The results of procurements in fiscal year 1963,
under guidance contained in Secretary McNamara's directive
of July 16, 1962, as amended, are reflected in the follow-
ing tables
.
Table I shows that a total of four hundred and
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seven million dollars in supplies, services and construc-
tion was awarded to foreign contractors covering require-
ments for use outside of the United States, its possessions
and Puerto Rico. Compared with contract awards made in
fiscal year 1962, there is indicated a decrease in
contract awards amounting to seventy-nine million dollars
or sixteen per cent.
TABLE I.—Foreign Origin Procurement for use outside the
U. S. a (New Contract Awards) Fiscal Year 1963 (Value in
millions of dollars)
_ . Awards of Less Awards of $10,000Country Total __. ^.^ ___





aExcluding Military Assistance Program, petroleum,
non-appropriated fund procurements and purchases made in
Korea and Canada. Source: Directorate for Statistical
Services, OSD.
Table II shows the estimated amount of procurement
normally placed with foreign sources, but returned for
purchase in the United States.
Table III shows the cost of making these purchases
in the United States. All told, there was a total of
ninety-six million dollars in domestic contracts whose
estimated cost would have been seventy- five million dollars
in foreign contracts. The added cost to Department of
Total, all
countries 407 96
Western Europe 287 72
Japan 83 16





Western Europe 81.0 10.6
Japan 7.9 3.3
Canada .6 0.0
All other 6.9 1.2
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Defense was twenty-one million dollars or twenty-eight
per cent more than the estimated foreign costs.
TABLE II.—Procurement normally placed with Foreign Sources
but obtained from Domestic Sources (Fiscal Year 1963)
(Value in millions of dollars)
_ a m m. -i Awards of Less Awards of $10,000Country01 Total Irf. * n ^ rt^b „ b






aForeign Source with lower price.
Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.
Source: Directorate for Statistical Services, OSD.
TABLE III.—Added cost of returning Procurement to the
United States (Fiscal Year 1963) (Value in millions of
dollars)
_ a ™ Awards of Less Awards of $10,000Country** Total m, + .- ~~~b „ b
f Than $10,000" or More
Added cost - total 20.9 2.1 18.8
Western Europe 18.3 1.3 17.0
Japan 1.7 .6 1.1
All other .8 .1 .7
aForeign source with lower price.
Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.
Source: Directorate for Statistical Services, OSD.
•.
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Table IV shows the four hundred and twenty- four
million dollars of new contracts for foreign origin
supplies and services, broken down by the various excep-
tions specified in the July 16, 1962 directive which
permitted procurements abroad. Requirements which could
be filled only from foreign sources amounted to one
hundred and eighty million dollars, or forty-two per
cent of the total exceptions. Perishable subsistence
purchases amounted to seventy-three million dollars, or
seventeen per cent of total exceptions. Purchases made
pursuant to a treaty or executive agreement between
governments amounted to sixty-two million dollars, or
fifteen per cent of total procurements under the excep-
tions. Purchases under ten thousand dollars each made
under the "price differential exception" totalled fifty
million dollars, or twelve per cent of total exceptions.
The "all other" category consists of purchases, in excess
of ten thousand dollars each for which the estimated
domestic cost was over fifty per cent that of foreign
cost, and which amounted to forty-nine million seven
hundred thousand dollars, or thirteen per cent of total
exceptions.
As previously stated in 1962, the Secretary of
Defense set as the long-range goal of the Department of
Defense a reduction in the net adverse effect of United
States defense expenditures entering the balance-of-pay-
ments to one billion by fiscal year 1966. The question,
however, arose as to what further action could be taken
in the area of overseas expenditures for major equipment
and supplies to meet the objective? Further, what would
be the net effect of any such action upon the Department
I
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of Defense? To attempt to answer these questions it was
necessary to analyze the foreign origin procurements made
during fiscal year 1963 under the authorized exceptions of
the July 16, 1962 directive.
TABLE IV.—Foreign Origin Procurements for use outside
United States by Exceptions permitted in July 16, 1962
Directive (New Contract Awards) a (Fiscal Year 1963)
(Value in millions of dollars)
Exception Total
Exceptions, total 423.6
Treaty or Executive Agreement 62.2
Procurements of $500 or less 26.9
Emergency procurements under $10,000 1.7
Perishable subsistence 73.0
Requirements can be filled only by foreign
supplies or services 179.9
Cuban crisis .5
Other purchases under $10,000 22.8
Excess foreign currencies 6.8
All other 49.7
aExcluding Military Assistance Program, petroleum,
nonappropriated funds procurement, and construction.
Source: Directorate for Statistical Services, OSD.
Requirements which could be filled
Only with Foreign Supplies
or Services
According to the data contained in Table IV,
requirements which could be filled only from foreign
sources amounted to one hundred eighty million dollars, or
forty-two per cent of total procurements. Almost all of
WM
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the requirements purchased under this exception fall
into one of the following categories of requirements:
(1) utilities, including gas, water, electricity, steam,
sewage, refuse collection and disposal; (2) communication
services; (3) port handling and stevedoring services;
(4) maintenance and repair of, and procurement of spare
parts for, foreign manufactured vehicles, equipment,
machinery and systems; (5) packing and crating services;
(6) laundry and dry cleaning; (7) coal handling and
storage; (8) industrial gases; and, (9) transportation
services. Everyone of these general areas, with the
exception of " (4) " above, were directly related to the
support of United States military forces on any installa-
tion whether in the United States or in a foreign country.
The nature of these supplies and services are such that
they cannot be obtained from other than the source located
in the general vicinity of the installation. Further, a
high portion of the cost for providing these supplies
and services is composed of overhead and indirect costs
and therefore the total cost does not fluctuate upward
or downward in direct relation to the strength of the
military force utilizing these supplies and services.
With respect to general area " (4) " above, almost
all of the expenditures are for fixed equipment, machinery
and systems of the installation. To replace this equip-
ment with United States manufactured equipment, machinery
or systems would usually necessitate the execution of
alteration and minor construction contracts which would
generate greater foreign exchange costs than were being
incurred in the procurement of maintenance and repair
services or spare parts for the foreign equipment, machinery
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and systems. It therefore can be concluded that costs
under this exception would continue to occur and would
remain constant in direct relation to the number of over-
seas installations maintained by the Department of
Defense.
Perishable Subsistence
Perishable subsistence purchases during fiscal
year 1963, totalled seventy-three million dollars and
represented seventeen per cent of total expenditures
under the exceptions. Purchases in this category which
exceeded ten thousand dollars per transaction were required
to be approved by a Major Overseas Commander. It therefore
can be assumed that these purchases represented the
minimum requirements needed to provide balanced diets to
military troops and dependents and that possible substitutes
of products of United States origin, not susceptible to
deterioration or spoilage while in shipment from the United
States, were considered rejected.
Although foreign exchange costs in this category
could be reduced by transporting perishable subsistence
of United States origin by military jet aircraft, the
cost to military appropriations, generated by such opera-
tions, would be three to five times as great as the costs
of procuring this subsistence in foreign countries.
Further, a sizable portion of the "airlift" capability
would have to be diverted to the accomplishment of this
task.
It therefore can be concluded that expenditures
in this category would remain constant in direct relation




Treaty or Executive Agreement
Procurements pursuant to a treaty or executive
agreement between governments amounted to sixty-two
million dollars, or fifteen per cent of total expenditures
under the exceptions.
Savings in this area were generally not subject
to control by the Department of Defense. Until such time
as new treaties or executive agreements were negotiated
and executed between the United States and the foreign
governments, reductions in this category would be minor
and of little significance in meeting the objectives of
the Department of Defense.
Procurements of $500 or Less
The twenty-seven million dollars expended for
purchases of five hundred or less per transaction
represented six per cent of total expenditures under the
exceptions. Supplies and services procured under this
exception usually were (1) emergency purchases, subsist-
ance, sole source, etc., or (2) "one-time" or "sporadic"
requirements which even though available from sources in
the United States, were not recurring requirements and
therefore did not justify the costs associated with the
maintenance of stocks of the items at the overseas
installation.
The requirements under this exception were
usually procured under one of the simplified purchase
procedures (Imprest Funds, Blanket Purchase Agreements,




accomplishing small dollar purchases with considerably
less administrative effort and cost than that usually
associated with the more complex procurement methods. 11
The abolishment of this exception to purchase small
requirements abroad, would (1) in the case of the first
category of items and services, result in the requirements
being purchased from foreign sources under one of the other
exceptions available; or, (2) in the case of the supplies
in the second category, result in increased Department of
Defense appropriation cost because stocks of these items
would have to be established and maintained to allow for
the delays associated with the requisitioning of these
requirements from the United States.
In light of the above, it can be concluded that
the retention of this exception was appropriate and
purchases thereunder would continue as long as forces are
maintained abroad.
Other Purchases Under $10,000
and "Other Purchases "
The combined expenditures under the exceptions
"Other Purchases under $10,000" and "Other Purchases"
amounted to seventy-two and a half million dollars and
represented approximately seventeen per cent of total
expenditures under all exceptions. These purchases
consisted of requirements which were available from United
States sources but because the domestic cost was over
1:LU. S. President, 1961-1963 (Kennedy), Message to
Congress on Balance of Payments and Gold , February 6, 1961,
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XVII, 1961.

38
fifty per cent higher than the foreign costs, determina-
tions were made to satisfy the requirements through purchase
from foreign sources
.
By requiring all of these requirements to be
procured from United States sources or by increasing the
price differential to be added to domestic prices for
evaluation purposes, a substantial dollar amount would
be eliminated from the United States balance-of-payments.
According to statistics maintained by the Depart-
ment of Defense, the additional costs incurred by making
purchases from domestic sources under the fifty per cent
price differential rule totalled twenty-one million dollars
or twenty-eight per cent more than the estimated cost of
foreign source items. The twenty-eight per cent repre-
sented the average increased cost of individual require-
ments where the price differential was from one per cent
to forty-nine per cent greater than the foreign cost.
If the purchases made during fiscal year 1963
from foreign sources under the fifty per cent differential
rule were to have been purchased from domestic sources,
the added costs to the Department of Defense would have
been at least fifty per cent (thirty-seven million dollars)
greater than they were when purchased from foreign sources.
Although it was recognized by the President of
the United States that some increased budgetary costs would
accrue by virtue of the reduction of dollar flow abroad
and the Congress had been apprised of the "cost differential"
rules being applied in the purchase of requirements for use
outside the United States, 12 there was some question as to
12U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary
of Defense "Supplies and Services to be Procured and Used
Outside of the United States, " Memorandum to the Service
Secretaries, Washington, D. C, December 16, 1960.
1
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what extent these increased costs would be tolerated in
defense appropriations before other actions, outside the
"Government Account" sector, would be considered more
appropriate to curb dollar outflow.
Construction of New Facilities/Maintenance ,
Repair. Alteration of
Existing Facilities
The initial effort to reduce overseas military
expenditures for construction of real property and the
maintenance, repair and alteration to existing real property
was that made on December 16, 1960 when the Secretary of
Defense directed that "No further contracts for the
construction of family housing and related facilities,
such as schools chapels, hospitals, and commissories would
be awarded pending rejustification and specific approval
from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Property and Installations)."^
On July 12, 1962, the Secretary of Defense
announced a plan to reduce the foreign exchange cost of
overseas construction by the use of techniques such as
prefabricated housing, constructed in the United States
and transported to overseas areas. -^ Again on November
27, 1962, the Secretary of Defense announced a goal of
13
U. S. Department of Defense, Statement by Secretary
of Defense at Press Conference, Washington, D. C, July
16, 1962.
14U. S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, "Real Property Maintenance, Repair,
Alteration, and Minor Construction Accomplished by




reducing by twenty- five per cent the fiscal year 1963
estimated expenditures for maintenance, repair, altera-
tion and minor construction of real property overseas.
This goal would be accomplished by: (1) procuring the
maximum amount of materials and supplies in the United
States to be supplied contractors as a replacement for
those now being furnished by the contractors; and, (2)
restricting alteration and minor construction projects
performed by contract to those urgently required for the
support of the military mission. To insure that the
objective was being met, a rule was set forth which
required that all contracts for maintenance estimated
to exceed $100,000 or repair work in the $50,000
—
$100,000 cost category would be approved by the Secretary
of the Military Department or his designee. Further, any
requirement for repair work estimated to exceed $100,000
would require approval in advance by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Installations & Logistics) or his
designee. 15
The restraining orders on the expenditures of
funds overseas for construction of new facilities or for
the rehabilitation and maintenance of existing facilities
were, when considered by themselves, negative in nature
and were of little benefit in reducing the balance of
payments deficits. There is little question that as long
as military units are located at specific overseas
facilities, needs will exist for new facilities to house
and support the military members and their dependents.





light of other actions initiated, they represent a major
factor in the overall Department of Defense overseas
expenditure reduction program. One such supplementary
action involves the consolidation and/or elimination
of overseas facilities, announced by the Secretary of
Defense on July 16, 1962:
A comprehensive review of the requirements for
each of our foreign military bases and installations
occupied by United States military services has been
undertaken. As a part of this over-all review, a
special study group visited selected countries in
Western Europe to determine the feasibility of
combined utilization of depots with our Allies, as
well as to ascertain the possibilities for a
reduction, elimination or consolidation of head-




To construct new facilities or the rehabilitation of
existing facilities at locations which could subsequently
be declared "nonessential" in overall defense planning,
would not only result in unnecessary foreign exchange
costs but would subject the Department of Defense to
criticism for inadequate planning resulting in unwarrented
budgetary expenditures.
Various newspaper articles from July 16, 1962 to
1964 tended to reflect the success of the consolidation/
elimination of overseas facilities program:
President John F. Kennedy said Thursday the United
States has withdrawn some support troops from Europe
in the past few months but there is no present plans
to bring home any U. S. combat forces. He said there
l^U. s. Department of Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, "Supplies and Services to be Procured
and Used outside of the United States, " Memorandum to the
Service Secretaries, Washington, D. C, July 16, 1962.
.
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merely had been a "lessening of logistic forces" but
the action had not at all lessened the number of our
combat troops. '
The 4085th Wing of the U. S. Strategic Air Command
is pulling out of this high Arctic community of
Frobisher Bay, Baffin Island, Northwest Territories. 18
Canada and the United States have agreed to abandon
twenty-eight of the smaller stations of the Distant
Early Warning Line radar chain. About 123 Canadians
and 60 U. S. citizens will be affected. 19
The United States is expanding its military
traffic through the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam
and it is reported that U. S. supply lines are to
be shifted out of France entirely to the Belgian
and Dutch ports. U. S. Authorities state the inten-
tion is to phase out gradually the U. S. supply
lines across France . . . Gilpatric said the Pentagon
planned to shrink its housekeeping and logistical
troops in France and other areas 7here the dollar
drain is heavy. 20
The Pentagon announced today that it would shortly
begin cutting back the strategic B47 bomber forces
stationed in Britain. The cutback, long pending, will
result in the evacuation of two B-47 bases, which will
be turned over to the Royal Air Force. The assign-
ment of 2,659 USAF officers and men will be affected. 21
United States to cut Air Force in Japan by 3500
military personnel and 2000 dependents. B57 Bombard-
ment Wing will be deactivated and Tactical Air Command
fighter squadrons will be rotated into Misawa Air Base
1 7Washington Post .. 15 February 1963.
18Philadelphia Inquirer , 15 July 1963.
19The Globe and Mail , Toronto, Canada, 16 July 1963
2QWashinaton Post , 21 July 1963.
Baltimore Sun , 12 November 1963.
'
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from other bases in the world to avoid leaving any
gap in Northern Japan's air defenses. 22
The consolidation and/or elimination of overseas
facilities without materially reducing the United States
defense capabilities, resulted in: (1) the return of
redundant logistic forces to the United States; (2) the
transfer of United States logistic supply points and
operations to countries where the foreign exchange costs
were reduced or eliminated through "country-to-country
offset agreements;" and/or (3) the withdrawal of older
weapon systems overseas with mission responsibilities
assigned to more advanced weapon systems located within
the United States, appeared to be the most direct means
in attempting to reduce the military deficits in the
United States balance-of-payments
.




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS: A POTPOURRI
Military Assistance Program
Insofar as the Military Assistance Program was
concerned, the adverse United States balance-of-payments
received its first major consideration with the passage
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Section 604 (a)
of this Act prescribes:
Funds made available under this Act may be used
for procurement outside the United States only if
the President determines that such procurement will
not result in adverse effects upon the economy of
the United States or the industrial mobilization
base, with special reference to any areas of labor
surplus or to the net position of the United States
in its balance of payments with the rest of the
world, whi.ch outweigh the economic or other advantages
to the United States of less costly procurement out-
side the United States. ...
On October 18, 1961, the President of the United
States determined in pertinent part, under Section 606 (a)
of the Act that:
I also hereby direct that funds made available
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for military
assistance programs not be used for procurement out-
side the United States except to procure items
required for military assistance which are not
produced in the United States, to make local pur-
chases for administrative purposes, and to use
U. S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 2125.1,
"Military Assistance Program Offshore Procurement (MAP/




local currency available for military assistance
purposes. Upon certification by the Secretary of
Defense, however, that exclusion of procurement
outside the United States would seriously impede
attainment of military assistance program objectives,
the Secretary of Defense may authorize exceptions
to these limitations. 2
The Department of Defense implementation of Section 604
(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the President's
directive of October 18, 1961, was by Department of Defense
Directive 2125.1, dated January 2, 1962, the act which
authorized the use of Military Assistance Program funds
for offshore procurements, subject to certification by
the Assistant Secretary of Defense that the exclusion
of procurement outside the United States would seriously
impede the attainment of Military Assistance Program
objectives, for the following additional purposes: (1)
Government-to-Government cost-sharing projects under the
Mutual Weapons Development Program; (2) Government-to-
Government commitments involving cost-sharing production
projects, when MAP is an integral part of the cost-sharing
commitment; (3) Procurement required to support over-
riding foreign policy objectives as approved by the
Secretary of State; and, (4) Procurement required to
support overriding military logistical considerations
which are important to the defensive capabilities of the
Free World. 3
On December 5, 1963, the Department of Defense
2Ibid .
3U. S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 2125.1,
"Military Assistance Program Offshore Procurement (MAP/
OSP)," December 5, 1963.
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issued a revised Directive 2125.1. The major changes
included: (1) a requirement that all Military Assistance
Program procurements contemplated to be made outside the
United States, its possessions and Puerto Rico, which
were estimated to exceed three million dollars would be
referred to the Secretary of Defense for determination on
a case by case basis; (2) a provision that Military
Assistance Program procurement of supplies and services
(including construction materials, but excluding construc-
tion services) to be used outside the United States, its
possessions and Puerto Rico, would be restricted to domestic
source end products, or services of domestic concerns
located in the United States if the price delivered from
the United States sources would not exceed ten thousand
dollars; (3) a provision that procurements which exceed
ten thousand dollars would be restricted to United States
domestic sources if the estimated domestic price was
estimated to be not more than fifty per cent in excess
of the cost of Foreign supplies or services; (4) a require-
ment that all procurements in excess of ten thousand
dollars where the domestic price exceeds the fifty per
cent differential, would be referred to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for determination and approval; (5)
a limitation on the use of Military Assistance Program
funds for new commitments on government-to-government
cost-sharing projects; and (6) authority to continue the
use of Military Assistance Program funds for United States
contributions to the budgets of International Military




Overseas Expenditures by Individuals
On September 30, 1960, there were 529,000 United
States military personnel and 21,000 United States
Department of Defense civilian employees assigned in
foreign countires. These military and civilian personnel
were accompanied by 487,000 dependents.
The Presidential directive of November 16, 1960,
called for a reduction in the number of dependents over-
seas, at a rate of 15,000 per month commencing January 1,
1961, to a total of not more than 200, 000. 6
According to the schedule established by the
Presidential directive, a total of nineteen months would
be required to reduce the 487,000 dependents to the
maximum of 200,000. The reduction of dependents overseas
would result, according to Department of Defense calcu-
lations, in a balance-of-payments savings of eighty-
three dollars per dependent/month, thereby resulting in
balance-of-payments savings totaling $97.1 million in
calendar year 1961; $257.7 million in calendar year 1962;
and $285.0 million in calendar year 1963. 7
5
U. S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Letter to the President of the United
States, 1 February 1961.
U. S. President, 1952-1960 (Eisenhower), Directive
by the President Concerning Steps to be Taken with Respect
to the United States Balance of Payments . November 16, 1960,
Federal Register, Vol. 25, No. 232, Washington, Wednesday,
pp. 12219-12278, p. 12221.
7
U. S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Letter to the President of the United
States, 1 February 1961.
"
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The Military Services issued the initial directive
to their activities, announcing the implementation of that
portion of the directive dealing with the limitation of
dependents, on November 18, 1960. Immediate action was
directed to: (1) discontinue overseas movement of depend-
ents who were not in receipt of a reservation scheduling
overseas travel prior to February 1, 1961; (2) allow those
individuals not selected for overseas assignment prior
to November 18, 1960, who have submitted a "volunteer
statement for overseas duty, " to withdraw such statement;
(3) discontinue issuance of dependent travel authoriza-
tions; (4) discontinue granting authorizations to extend
beyond the normal overseas tour to any military personnel
accompanied by dependents.
On November 23, 1960, the Overseas Military Commands
were directed to hold in abeyance all actions to incure
additional obligations and commitments of funds for the
procurement of new/replacement furniture, for the reha-
bilitation and/or improvement of government owned family
quarters and for the acquisition of new leased family
9
units.
That portion of the President's directive, dealing
with the prohibition against the resale of foreign goods
in nonappropriated fund activities, was implemented by the
o
U. S. Department of Air Force, All Major Command
Message 1414/60, dated 18 November 1960.
9U. S. Department of Air Force, All Major Command
Message 1427/60, dated 23 November 1960.
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the Secretary of Defense on November 25 , I960. 10
During December 1960 and January 1961, the
Military Services conducted numerous studies on the effects
the restriction on dependents overseas would have upon
military personnel. On February 1, 1961, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense sent a letter to the President of the
United States advising him of the adverse effects on the
morale and career incentives of military personnel gener-
ated by the restrictions on the movement of dependents
overseas. Also in this letter, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense outlined various programs which could be imple-
mented, to reduce the expenditures overseas by military
and civilian personnel and their dependents, that would
generate greater savings than that contemplated by the
restriction on dependents overseas. •*• On February 1, 1961,
President Kennedy recinded the Presidential Directive of
November 16, 1960, as it dealt with the limitation of
dependents overseas, and directed that the alternate
methods and programs to reduce overseas expenditures be
implemented immediately. ^
The Department of Defense actions to reduce over-
seas expenditures by military and United States civilian
10U. S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, "Nonappropriated Fund Activities
of Department of Defense, " Memorandum to the Service
Secretaries, Washington, D. C, 25 November 1960.
•^U. S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Letter to the President of the United
States, 1 February 1961.
12U. S. President, 1961-1963 (Kennedy), Message
to Congress on Balance of Payment and Gold , February 6,
1961, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XVII, 1961.
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personnel and their dependents fell into three separate
categories. One category dealt specifically with ways
and means to change the spending and saving habits of the
individuals abroad. Another category dealt with the
operations of Nonappropriated Fund Activities with a view
of improving the services offered so as to satisfy the
minimum needs of overseas personnel and thereby reduce
the dollar expenditures by individuals in the local
economies. The third category involved actions to reduce
to an absolute minimum our military and civilian forces
overseas, consistent with our overseas military commitments,
without degrading the effectiveness of our military
strength. For the purpose of clarity and simplicity,
the various actions taken by the Department of Defense in
the area of individual expenditures have been grouped for
discussion under the three categories mentioned above.
Actions to Change Spending
and Saving Habits of
Individuals
The initial action in this category was taken on
March 6, 1961, with an objective to reduce expenditures
by individuals abroad by $75 to $110 million during
calendar year 1961. Because there were slightly over one
million individuals (military members, United States
citizen civilian employees and dependents of both) abroad,
an average reduction in spending of seventy- five to one
hundred ten dollars per year per capita would be required
to meet this objective. In this action, the military
departments were directed to: (1) initiate an extensive
education process to point out the position of the United
*
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States in the international balance of payments and the
action the individual may take which would contribute
to a solution of the problem; (2) institute a voluntary
program for reduction of individual expenditures for
foreign goods to items which
—
Are purchased in an exchange outlet or other
approved United States military operated resale
activity, and then only to goods for which a real
need exists. Are required for the use of the
individual or his household incident to his duty
overseas and a reasonable substitute can not be
procured from an exchange outlet or from the United
States. If not covered under above, do not exceed
a total cost of one hundred dollars per year per
individual overseas; 13
(3) encourage and promote a savings program to the end
that there would be an average one hundred dollars
additional savings per year for each individual overseas.
To supplement the voluntary savings program, the
Department of Defense imposed a prohibition upon the
transportation at government expense of foreign made
motor vehicles purchased by Department of Defense personnel
or their dependents. The only exceptions to this prohi-
bition were the fact that the car was owned or on order
on or before March 6, 1961, the date of the order establish-
ing the prohibition, or when it had been established that
adequate facilities did not exist for the maintenance and
repair of motor vehicles produced and assembled in the
United States. Further, the Department of Defense took
no action to urge extension of the Act of December 5, 1942
13U. S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, "Overseas Expenditures Reduction
Program— Individual," Memorandum to the Service Secretaries,
Washington, D. C, March 6, 1961.
'-
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which expired on June 30, 1961. This Act offered the
entry, free of custom charges, of bonafide gifts from
members of the Armed Forces of the United States to the
extent of fifty dollars in any shipment. After expira-
tion of the Act, the ten dollar free entry for gifts
available to tourists was applicable to members of the
United States Armed Forces.
Many individuals consider the voluntary savings
programs of little or no benefit in reducing overseas
expenditures by Department of Defense personnel and
their dependents. They actually claim that the environ-
ment and social conditions associated with most overseas
assignments (v/here dependents are allowed) were such
that service personnel were induced to spend rather than
save. In support of this position, this group usually
cites the following examples:
1) The average military family of five or six,
located in almost any part of the United States, must
exercise considerable planning in managing its financial
matters. The subject of "Help" to the housewife with
household tasks and taking care of the children is not
even considered except on special occasions. In contrast,
this same family in many overseas locations is able to
obtain "domestic help" on a full time basis for about
the same costs as "once a week" help in the United States.
Even though the "once a week" help was not utilized while
within the United States, once overseas, who would not
expend this nominal cost to give the wife a well deserved
vacation from these household chores?
2) Most American families can only dream of an
extended trip to a foreign country. Only a very small
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percentage of these families realize such a dream in
their life time. This factor has a direct bearing upon
military families assigned overseas. The thought
—
"we may never be able to afford a vacation to this area"
—
tends to stimulate extended travel and vacations, not
only in the country of assignment, but to all surrounding
countries as well. The cumulative costs of such vacations
quite often exceeded current earnings and were financed
from past savings.
3) In a large number of overseas areas, Depart-
ment of Defense members were required to utilize their
own personal household goods and effects at their over-
seas location. During overseas tours, the members and
families were exposed to high quality household goods
at prices greatly reduced from prices of comparable
merchandise in the United States or at prices comparable
to United States "mass produced" merchandise of sometimes
inferior quality. Because of this, military members
tended to postpone normal replacement purchases while
in the United States in anticipation of an overseas
assignment; or, accomplish earlier disposal of still
functionally satisfactory household goods and replacement
with a purchase in the overseas area prior to rotation
back to the United States. As a result, the expenditures
by military members for household goods while overseas
greatly exceeded the normal annual expenditures in this
category while in the United States.
On the other hand, there are those officials and
individuals who, while agreeing to the increased expendi-
tures of military members on overseas tours, point to
numerous statistics which: (1) clearly point out the
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benefits of extended travel in the broadening of the
education of military members; thus, preparing them to
assume positions of greater responsibility within the
Department of Defense; (2) stress the importance of "meet-
ing the people" of our Allies to learn their customs,
traditions and problems thereby resulting in a better
basis for cooperation and understanding during war-time
periods; (3) reflect the rapid attrition rate of household
goods subjected to frequent moves. As such, it is
necessary from a purely economic point of view, for
military members to procure better quality merchandise
to withstand this abnormal wear and tear.
Nonappropriated Fund Activities
of the Department of Defense
That portion of the Presidential Directive of
November 17, 1960, which prohibited the purchase of foreign
goods by nonappropriated fund activities, was implemented
by the Department of Defense on November 25, 1960. In
this implementation, interim authority was granted to
procure items of subsistence and other items which could
not be immediately procured from the United States and it
was determined that such items were essential to the
health and welfare of personnel of the Department of
Defense and their dependents. 14 In addition, this imple-
mentation established procedures for the submission of
requests for exception under the Presidential Directive.
1 U. S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, "Nonappropriated Fund Activities
of Department of Defense, " Memorandum to the Service
Secretaries, Washington, D. C, 25 November 1960.
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During the next ten months, a series of exceptions
were granted from the provisions of the Presidential
Directive as it related to the purchase of foreign goods
by nonappropriated fund activities. These included:
1) December 6, 1960—authority was granted to
purchase foreign perishable goods, beverages and similar
items for consumption on the premises.^
2) December 6, 1960—authority was granted to
purchase foreign goods for other than resale provided it
has been determined that goods manufactured in the United
States, serving the same functional purpose, were not
available.^
3) December 22, 1960—nonappropriated fund
activities located in Canada and Mexico were exempted
from the provisions of the directive. Some of the primary
factors which had a bearing upon the issuance of this
exception were the economic ties and contiguous borders
between the United States and these countries; the
exempted status of dependents in both Canada and Mexico;
and, the common interest in providing for the common
defense. *'
4) January 18, 1961—authority was granted to
purchase the following goods for resale: (a) goods for
which there are no acceptable substitutes of United States
manufacture and which are required to operate and/or
maintain customer owned equipment such as 220v/110v trans-
formers, bulbs, sockets, and accessories; (b) infant
Idem., 6 December 1960.
16Ibid .
17
Idem . , 22 December 1960.
•
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caskets; (c) distinctive unit ensigna; (d) soft drinks;
(e) printed matter such as maps, postcards, magazines,
newspapers, travel books, etc.; and, (f) items for use
in connection with hobby craft shop and craft programs
of the military services.^-8
5) February 2, 1961—nonappropriated fund
activities located in the Republic of Korea were auth-
orized to purchase for resale goods which were produced
or manufactured in the Republic of Korea. Reasons cited
as justification for this exception were: (a) favorable
effect of dollar earnings on the Korean economy; (b) the
relative small impact of nonappropriated fund purchases
of Korean goods on the balance-of-payments problem; and,
(c) the close economic, military and political associa-
tions and relationships between the United States and
the Republic of Korea.^
6) February 27, 1961—authority was granted to
purchase foreign goods in countries where the United
States Treasury held large accumulated balances of local
currency. All purchases made under this authority were
required to be payable in foreign currencies rather than
United States dollars. 20
7) June 6, 1961—authority was granted to: (a)
make emergency purchases; (b) make purchases pursuant to
treaty or executive agreements; (c) purchase foreign goods
for other than resale wherein it is estimated the cost of
United States goods serving the same functional purpose
18Idem ., 18 January 1961.
19Idem., 2 February 1961.
20Idem ., 27 February 1961.
'
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(including transportation and handling costs) would exceed
foreign costs of foreign goods by more than twenty- five
per cent; (d) purchase foreign high octane gasoline,
kerosene, and heating and cooking fuels for resale which
are not otherwise available from appropriated fund stocks;
(f) purchase automobile parts for American-made cars
from foreign sources where supplies of American manufac-
turers are not available from either bonded warehouses
or foreign distributors. ^1
After approximately nine months of operations by
overseas nonappropriated fund activities under the provis-
ions of the Presidential Directive of November 17, I960,
as implemented by the Department of Defense, the Secretary
of Defense announced a major change in policy governing
the sale of foreign goods by nonappropriated fund
activities. By Memorandum of August 8, 1961, he stated:
It is recognized that procurement of locally
available foreign items by U. S. personnel in
overseas areas produce a more favorable effect on
the balance of payments problem if procured through
U. S. operated nonappropriated fund resale activities,
rather than if such items are procured directly by
such personnel on the local economy.
Prior instructions from this office are further
modified to authorize these activities to henceforth
deal in foreign items with the following provisions:
1. Transshipment directly between major overseas
commands, i.e., USCINCPAC area and USCINEUR area, of
items other than beverages, is prohibited.
2. Shipments among countries within an overseas
command shall be held to a minimum so that, in general,
only foreign items readily available locally will be
dealt in by nonappropriated fund activities.
3. Foreign items, with the exception of beverages,
sold through these activities shall be priced at least
21Idem ., June 6, 1961.
' .
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as high as in local markets.
Previous instructions in conflict with policy
are hereby amended. 22
As a result of this change in policy, the nonappropriated
fund activities reverted back to operations generally
the same as were in effect prior to the Presidential
Directive of November 17, 1960. This cycle of actions
substantiates the theories of many that as lona as it is
to the financial advantage of the Department of Defense
personnel to buy foreign made products, in lieu of United
States manufactured products, such purchases will be
accomplished.
Reduction of United States
Forces Overseas
When the Department of Defense was taking action
to implement the President's Directive of November 19,
1960, it was estimated that each dependent overseas spent
an average of $1,000 per year in the local economies.
In the latter part of 1961, it was estimated that the
personal expenditures in the local economies of United
States military and civilian forces and their dependents
was an average of $750 per year per person, including
dependents . ^3
With over one million military and civilian
personnel and dependents overseas, it can readily be seen
22
Idera., 8 August 1961.
23Walter S. Salant, (and others), "U. S. Balance
of Payments in 1968," Brookings Institute, p. 145, pp. 298
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that one major factor contributing to the deficit in the
military sector of the United States balance-of-payments
was the expenditures on the local economies by these
individuals. However, the Kennedy Administration rejected
the "easy course of action" for reducing the number of
individuals overseas who were associated with our defense
posture by rescinding the order of the preceding Administra-
tion on the restriction of dependents overseas. In lieu
thereof, the Department of Defense undertook a compre-
hensive review of all United States military units over-
seas to determine if, in light of the overall defense
posture, a reduction of military personnel as well as
dependents could be accomplished.
Quick Reaction Airlift Capability
One means for reducing overseas military personnel
was to expand the program for prepositioning equipment
and supplies in forward areas where trouble is likely to
occur and utilize airlift to rapidly transport military
forces, held in reserve in some central location within
the United States, to the troubled area.
The "Big Lift" exercise conducted in October 1963,
when 15,000 military personnel were airlifted from Texas
to Western Europe, has been identified as the initial step
towards the withdrawal of substantial numbers of United
States military personnel from Europe. Although the
exercise was not officially announced as a means for
reducing the military deficit in the United States balance-
of-payments, the exercise was so identified primarily on
the basis of the statement made in Chicago, Illinois on
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October 19, 1963, by the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Roswell Gilpatric:
This Big Lift exercise will demonstrate our
ability to project our military power far more
quickly over far larger distances than has ever been
the case in the past. By employing such a multibase
capability, the U. S. should be able to make useful
reductions in its heavy overseas military expendi-
tures without diminishing its effective military
strength or its capacity to apply that strength
swiftly in support of its world-wide policy commitments
.
2^
In the eyes of many, the "Big Lift" exercise was
termed an overwhelming success in demonstrating how far
the United States had come in developing global mobility
for its forces. Whereas, others proclaimed it as success-
ful in peacetime, politically dangerous in time of crisis
and totally useless in time of an armed conflict:
There remains a discussion of the airlift in
case of the outbreak of an armed conflict . . .
picture the situation in Europe after the first day
of local nuclear conflict. . . . Let us assume the
enemy has attacked. All available tactical aircraft
are engaged in counter strikes against the enemy's
lines of communication, and their numbers are decimated
in the process . . . soon no airfields will remain
intact, having been plastered by the enemy's short
and medium range missiles. Furthermore, the distance
from the border to the supply depots is short, 200
miles or less, so that relatively unsophisticated
missiles suffice to destroy them. . . . The Big Lift
would find no fighter cover, no airfields, no depots.
To send an airlift of the dimensions of Big Lift into
the battle zone or the supply depots would be pure
folly. 25
?4Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Speech on October 19, 1963, in Chicago, Illinois, Air
Force and Space Digest , December 1963.
25Stefan Geisenheyner, "And How Did the Europeans




The predictions that United States troops in
Europe would be reduced was, from a military view, alarm-
ing to some United States Allies. They claimed that any
withdrawal of forces from any likely danger zone would
increase the risk involved and the temptation for the
aggressor to attack. It was stated that United States
forces in Europe were by far the strongest deterrent on
the ground to an assault by Russia and that a withdrawal
of all or part of the United States divisions could tempt
her into military ventures that would not be considered
if United States forces were present.
On the other hand there are those that felt
Europeans should quit applying the "double standard"
when discussing the common defense—that of expecting
the United States to meet its NATO commitments as a
matter of course, while never coming near to fulfilling
their own obligations in the alliance. In this connec-
tion, General Eisenhower said:
When I went back to Europe in 1951 to command the
forces of NATO, the United States agreed to supply
the equivalent of six infantry divisions which were
to be regarded as an emergency reinforcement of
Europe while our hard-hit Allies were rebuilding
their economies and capabilities for supporting
defense. Now twelve years later, those forces,
somewhat reinforced, are still there. ... I believe
the time has now come when we should start withdraw-
ing some of these troops . Although we have invested
billions of dollars in air and naval bases and have
built up a supply system all over Europe . . . all
this does not seem to have the same effect of
"showing the flag" as far as Europeans are concerned,
as the presence of U. S. ground troops. . . . One
American division in Europe can "show the Flag" as
'
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definitely as can several. 26
The outright withdrawal of one or more of the
United States Army divisions from Western Europe did
not result in a substantial reduction in the net deficit
in the United States balance of payments. The divisions
were located almost entirely within the Federal Republic
of Germany, the one NATO country most concerned in a
unified common defense afforded by a strong NATO. To
help reduce the deficit in the United States balance of
payments attributed to military expenditures in Germany,
an "offset" agreement was executed by the Federal Republic
of Germany with the United States. Under this agreement,
the United States provided a cooperative logistic system
for the Armed Forces of both countries and the Federal
Republic of Germany increased the level of military
procurements in the United States and utilized United
States supply lines, depots and maintenance and support
facilities in amounts which "offset" the foreign exchange
costs of maintaining United States forces in Germany.
Therefore, a reduction of military expenditures in
Germany resulting from the reduction of the number of
divisions located in Germany would also result in a
corresponding reduction in the amount of the "offset"
agreement
.
The policy of prepositioning of equipment and
supplies and the use of airlift to transport troops to
critical areas are considered by the Department of Defense
26Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Lets be Honest With




as tools for use primarily in meeting emergencies created
by limited war situations. 27 This factor, coupled with
the favorable "offset" agreement with the Federal Republic
of Germany, did not support the opinion that "Big Lift"
was intended to precede the withdrawal of one or more of
the Army divisions from Germany. This question was
resolved when the Secretary of State, in a speech at
Frankfurt, Germany on October 26, 1963 declared: "We
have six divisions in Germany. We intend to maintain
these divisions here as long as there is need for them
—
and under present circumstances there is no doubt that
they will continue to be needed. . . ."28 Further, at
a press conference in Washington, D. C. on October 31,
1963, President Kennedy reaffirmed that the United States
had no intention of reducing Array strength in Europe
under present conditions. ^
On January 14, 1964, the Department of Defense
announced plans to "again demonstrate its ability to
deploy combat troops quickly" with the movement of an
Army brigade by air from Hawaii to Okinawa. This Pacific
exercise will involve the matching of troops with heavy
07
U. S. Congress, "A Compilation of Material
Relating to United States Defense Policies in 1962,
"
House Document No. 155, 88th Congress, 1st Session , U. S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C, 1963.
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, Press Conference
in Frankfurt, Germany on October 26, 1963, Washington Post ,
October 27, 1963.
29U. S. President, 1961-1963 (Kennedy), Press
Conference in Washington, D. C. on October 31, 1963,
Washington Post , November 1, 1963.
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equipment and supplies prepositioned aboard converted
Victory
Islands.
ships now moored in Subic Bay in the Philippine
30
Rotation of United States
Military Personnel
The effective demonstration of military airlift
capabilities by "Big Lift" pointed the way towards another
possibility for reducing expenditures overseas in both the
"individual expenditure" and military expenditure sectors
of the United States balance of payments. This plan
involved the rotation of entire military units between
the United States and overseas locations. Under this
concept, the personnel of fully operational and combat-
ready forces, deployed in any part of the world, would
be rotated with personnel of similar forces located within
the United States. By reducing the tours of servicemen
involved in such swaps to periods of three, six or twelve
month periods the rotations would be accomplished without
dependents. Reducing dependents overseas would make
possible substantial reductions in support personnel and
facilities as well as reducing the percentage of the
servicemen's pay and allowances presently available for
spending on the local overseas economies. Support of this
plan was received from many quarters. Former President
Eisenhower stated:
It would be helpful, at this time, to put all of
our troops abroad on a "hardship basis"—that is,
send them on shortened tours of foreign duty and
without their families as we do in Korea. Unless we
30Baltimore Sun , January 14, 1964.
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take definite action, the maintenance of permanent
troop establishments abroad will continue to over-
burden our balance of payments problem. ...
Others pointed out that the United States Marine Corps had
been rotating units between the United States and over-
seas areas for several years and that, if it works for
one of the Services, it would work for the others also.
Still others stated that the rotation plan would overcome
three of the major criticisms directed at "Big Lift":
1) By maintaining combat-ready troops and equip-
ment in position at all times, the defensive capabilities
in the immediate danger zone would not be weakened.
2) Even if, during a rotation airlift, the
aggressor struck and destroyed the air bases in the
forward area, the incoming personnel could be landed in
rear areas and transported by other means to areas of
prepositioned equipment and supplies and then used as
reinforcements
.
3) The equipment and supplies, depended upon to
repel the initial strikes of the aggressor, would always
be in the hands of troops who would keep it positioned
and in constant readiness for such attacks.
On the other hand there are those that contended
that the rotation plan was nothing more than a new means
for restoring the restrictions of the Presidential
Directive of November 17, 1960. They felt that the good
and valid reasons, which were the basis for rescinding
31Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Lets be Honest With




the Presidential Directive, were still valid and present.
In addition to the hardships created by "separations"
from families, they contended that the rotation plan
would impose additional financial burdens upon the military
families or substantially increase the budgetary cost of
the Department of Defense. Questions asked or problems
posed most frequently in connection with the rotation plan
were: (1) Where will the dependents stay while the fathers
and husbands are overseas? (2) Will they be required to
vacate the government quarters at the United States
installation while the military member is overseas? (3)
If they are not required to vacate government quarters,
where will the military personnel returning from overseas
house their dependents? Most installations within the
United States do not have sufficient government quarters
to house the military families of the normal assignments
to the installation. To double the number of families
at an installation would only result in greatly inflated
rental and leasing costs of housing in the local community
which, in turn, would place an impossible burden upon all
military members seeking shelter off the military installa-
tion. To resolve the housing problem it would be necessary
to construct additional housing at the installation which
would be operating under the rotational plans; or, addi-
tional military installations would have to be activated
(or existing installations, which otherwise would be
surplus to the military needs, would have to be retained)
solely to accommodate the rotation plan.
The United States Marine Corps rotation program
involves the placement of military personnel on temporary
duty status while overseas thereby maintaining the
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permanent residence of the military dependents at the
United States installation. Also, only a portion of the
operational forces generally located at a United States
Marine Corps installation are involved in the rotation
at any one time. It is questionable if similar rotation
plans involving entire United States Army divisions or
Navy personnel would be feasible or possible.

CHAPTER V
ACCOUNTING OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE UNITED STATES
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Numerous questions were raised concerning the
accounting methods and reporting procedures for Depart-
ment of Defense transactions entering the United States
balance of payments. It has been alleged that reporting
and accounting of cash transactions abroad, did not
reflect the net adverse dollar outflow generated by
Department of Defense activities in carrying out its
overseas commitments. Typical examples cited of errone-
ous reporting and accounting fall into the following
categories
:
1) Department of Defense Contracts with Foreign
Contractors: The Department of Defense activities execute
many thousands of contracts with foreign contractors every
year. These contracts are for requirements which have
been determined, under provisions of the Department of
Defense balance of payments directives, to be of a type
or category requiring performance of work under the contract
to be accomplished in the overseas area. Although the
basic contract is always with a foreign contractor, in the
performance of the work it is often necessary for this
foreign contractor to subcontract a large portion of the
total contract cost for supplies, material and services




of payments statistics, the total contract amount of the
basic contract with the foreign contractor is recorded
and reported as a "United States Government Payment"
abroad. Whereas, the shipment of United States origin
supplies, equipment and services required for performance
under the basic contract are recorded and reported as
"Export of goods and Services" usually with little or no
identification that these exports were generated by a
Department of Defense contract with a foreign contractor.
2) Department of Defense Procurements accomplished
through Barter Transactions: One of the provisions of
the Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act,
Public Law 480, 83rd Congress, provides for the disposal
of surplus United States Agriculture commodities by
barter. Up to 1961, agricultural commodities disposed
of through barter were exchanged primarily for foreign-
produced strategic and critical materials, the bulk of
which was transferred to supplemental and national
stockpiles and counted towards achievement of the National
Stockpile Objectives. With the sharp curtailment of
stockpile of strategic and critical material in 1960 and
1961, efforts were made to expand the use of barter to
satisfy other United States government requirements. At
the direction of the President of the United States, an
Executive Stockpile Committee was established to study
the problems of the barter program. Several of the
recommendations made in the "Report on the Barter Program"
submitted to the President by the Stockpile Committee and
approved on September 20, 1962 by the President, were of
special concern and interest of the Department of Defense.
These recommendations provided that:
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Greater emphasis than in the past should be given
to the use of barter transactions for the procurement
of non-strategic material items (including but not
limited to offshore procurement) .... The Department
of Defense
. . . should cooperate with the Department
of Agriculture by effecting offshore procurement,
using qualified barter arrangements to the greatest
practicable extent when dollars would otherwise be
spent abroad for the items being procured. . . .
Offshore military procurement by barter should not be
effected in West Germany or any other country in which
the United States has arrangements for payments to
offset United States military expenditures in that
country, except with the concurrance of the Secretary
of the Treasury. ... In addition to the foregoing,
the Department of Defense . . . should continue to
cooperate with the Department of Agriculture to
convert to barter arrangements dollar contracts for
foreign-produced items.
Department of Defense barter procedures and instructions
were issued in February 1963. From March thru December
1963, Department of Defense activities overseas accomplished
barter procurements which totalled approximately fifty
million dollars. Even though the barter transaction does
not result in any dollar outflow from the United States
(only surplus agriculture commodities are shipped from
the United States, with the Department of Defense contractor
paid from the proceeds of the sale of these commodities in
foreign countries) the Department of Defense contract is
recorded as a "United States Government Payment" abroad.
In turn, the shipments of agriculture commodities under
the barter transaction are reflected in the balance of
payments as "Exports of goods and Services" usually with
little or no reference that such exports were generated by
a Department of Defense procurement abroad.
Although the reporting and recording of trans-
actions, as outlined above, balance out in the overall
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United States balance of payments statistics, to the
uninformed it appears that the Department of Defense is
the major and primary contributor in the growing amount
of outstanding dollars and dollar claims held by foreign
financial institutions and foreign individuals.
In order to clearly define and identify the net
adverse effect of Department of Defense expenditures in
support of overseas military operations, the Department
of Defense, issued Directive No. 7360.7, dated July 1, 1963,
which identified, among other things, those transactions
which did not result in an adverse dollar outflow to




The Department of Defense initiated and implemented
vigorous and aggressive actions to reduce the net adverse
effect military expenditures abroad had upon the United
States balance of payments during the period covered by
this paper.
The program to restrict procurement of foreign
manufactured or produced products resulted in sizable
reductions in the "military expenditure abroad" sector of
the United. States balance of payments. However, such
reductions were accomplished at an increased cost to the
Department of Defense budget of approximately 28 per cent
above the costs which would have been incurred if foreign
products had been purchased. Additional reductions of
approximately seventy million dollars could have been
realized in this area by increasing the price differential
allowed in the procurement of commodities or services of
United States origin; however, such additional reductions
would increase Department of Defense costs by at least
50 per cent for each additional dollar's worth of require-
ments returned to the United States for purchase.
Additional savings in expenditures for new
facilities and/or repair of existing facilities could be
accomplished only by a substantial reduction in the number






The negotiations and expansion of "Offset Agree-
ments" with foreign governments for joint use of facilities
and for the purchase of United States manufactured military
products, to compensate for the costs of maintaining
United States military units in overseas areas, represented
during the time frame under examination, the most signifi-
cant method for effecting further reductions in the
balance of payments deficits attributed to United States
overseas military commitments.
Voluntary programs for the reduction of personal
expenditures in foreign countries by Department of Defense
personnel and their dependents were of questionable value.
Mass rotation of combat units between the United
States and overseas locations would require a sizable
increase in the overall Department of Defense appropriations,
The rotation of small units, without dependents would have
contributed considerably in the reduction of personal
expenditures
.
Past identification and reporting procedures of
transactions entering the United States balance of payments
reflected a distorted picture of the net adverse effect
military expenditures abroad were having on the overall
balance of payments.
However, after some reflection, it is the considered
opinion of this author that further research and study of
this very complex problem be conducted. A possible point
of interest for some future scholar would be a considera-
tion of the advisability and ramifications involved in
checking the U. S. balance of payments deficits through
direct foreign support of U. S. Forces. This would, of
course, involve quantifying the costs and benefits
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associated with the "U. S. Defense Umbrella" that protects
much of the free world. Is it too much to ask for an
equitable contribution from ones Allies toward the mainte-
nance of his security? Furthermore, is the U. S. balance
of payments position best served by requiring a "buy
American policy" in the distribution of largesse through
offset agreements? Is it possible that U. S. policy,
and therefore its balance of payments position, might be
best served by removing all restrictions concerning the
market place in which U. S. foreign aid is spent, but at
the same time, insist that recipient countries contribute
to their national security on an equitable basis consistent
with the ability of each to contribute? The significance
of the answers to the questions posed are obvious and
adoption of them could generate sufficient cash flows into
the U. S. Treasury to return and maintain a favorable
balance in gold payments. The advisability of pursuing
this course of action and an in depth analysis of the
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